Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Volume 42 by Brad Inwood

By Brad Inwood

$A Oxford reviews in old Philosophy is a quantity of unique articles on all features of historic philosophy. The articles should be of considerable size, and comprise serious notices of significant books. OSAP is now released two times each year, in either hardback and paperback.'The serial Oxford reports in old Philosophy (OSAP) in all fairness considered as the major venue for book in historic philosophy. it truly is the place one Read more...

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Oxford stories in historical Philosophy is a quantity of unique articles on all features of historical philosophy. The articles should be of considerable size, and comprise severe notices of significant books. Read more...

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God’s knowledge [is not], like our own, dependent on the reality He knows; . . ’ See M. Dummett, Thought and Reality (Oxford, ),  and . For a more restricted, non-theological development of a broadly similar idea see C. Wright, Truth and Objectivity (Cambridge, ), –.  Another way of expressing this conviction would be to say that ‘truth’ is ‘the aim of’ or ‘the standard of correctness for’ the attitude of belief. For some recent ar Lessons from Euthyphro   –   every attitude of belief, whether knowledgeable or not, is objectively regulated in the following sense: its correctness depends on its object’s being one way rather than another.

A natural answer would be: just what Socrates does in the market-place, which is what he urges others to do, and what he is shown practising in the Gorgias and other ‘Socratic’ dialogues. It is the same activity at issue in all three cases: philosophizing (or dialectic, or practising the elenchus). This is what Socrates says the god has commanded him to do, what he urges others to do, what Plato elsewhere depicts him as doing—and what Callicles later dismisses as a waste of time. Here we come up against an account which deserves (I think) to be called standard: the same ‘Socratic method’ can be specified in three different ways: (A) what Socrates does in obedience to the god’s command; (B) what Socrates thereby urges others to do, and shows them how to do by example; (C) what Plato depicts Socrates as doing in the Gorgias and other ‘Socratic’ dialogues.

Rudebusch, ‘Socrates, Piety, and Nominalism’, Skepsis,  (), –.  For a recent attempt to support L, in the context of contemporary metaethics, see Sosa, ‘Pathetic Ethics’, –.  See Prot.  – ; Meno  – ; and Gorg.  – .  Certainly Plato’s wider anticonstructivist (and anti-naturalist) project will depend, at least to some extent, on the force of these other arguments. But that should not lead us to belittle the achievement of this argument, which—as we have seen—is both philosophically interesting and, if my interpretation is right, abundantly successful.

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